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abstraCt
Migration brokers are important participants within the increasingly commercialized policing of 
borders. Focusing on connections between migration brokers and state authorities, this paper asks 
how migration brokers relate to the realm of the law, as well as how the law relates to migration bro-
kerage. By examining illegality only when it becomes visible to aspiring migrants and brokers with-
in their context of departure, this paper demonstrates how state regulation is intimately intertwined 
with the emergence of migration brokerage. The argument of the paper provides a counter-point 
to studies of migration and illegality that often adopt an implicitly statist perspective by categoris-
ing brokers as either legal or illegal, as well as by framing brokers as agents that work ‘against’ the 
state. The paper is based on fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Anglophone Cameroon 
between 2007 and 2010 and illuminates the work of two NGOs that engage in so-called ‘travel 
consultations’. It contributes to on-going discussions within the ‘Migration Industry and Markets 
for Migration Control Network’.
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MiGratiON brOKeraGe, 
illeGality, aND the state: 
the Case Of tWO NGOs iN 
aNGlOphONe CaMerOON1
The posters of INACOD advertised ‘travel con-
sultations’. INACOD stands for ‘Internation-
al Assistance for Community Development.’ 
As an NGO, INACOD offered the following 
services: ‘admission and scholarships into for-
eign universities’, ‘foreign jobs’, ‘students’ ori-
entation and career counselling’, ‘information 
about opportunities’ and ‘travelling assistance’. 
Mr. James, who ran the office of INACOD, 
explained that his work catered for needs in 
”development and education.” He sent peo-
ple ”out” for study programmes as well as for 
work placements. In addition, he applied for 
international grants for development projects 
and offered ”career advice” at schools. This ca-
reer advice consisted of giving out information 
about some professional training schools in 
Cameroon with which he had formed partner-
ships, as well as about his own services of being 
able to make people travel internationally. 
In September 2007, Mr. James regularly 
disseminated advice on travelling and adver-
tisements for his organisation over the radio. 
In these radio shows, Mr. James presented 
himself as an expert on travelling and as one 
who could offer protection from the dangers 
of duping. He framed his work as “community 
work” by pointing out that travelling, study-
ing, and job placements abroad are all bene-
ficial for young people in Cameroon. In his 
discourse, Mr. James connected travelling to 
1 None of this work would have been possible with-
out the inestimable and precious input of Christina 
Atekmangoh (Graduate Institute Geneva). I also wish 
to thank Ninna Nyberg Sørensen for her highly valu-
able comments on the previous drafts of this working 
paper 
both development and his ambition to “make 
globalisation a reality”. 
Furthermore, Mr. James positioned himself 
as contributing to a fight against so-called “il-
legal migration”. On Labour Day on the 1st 
of May, the staff of INACOD participated in 
a demonstration carrying signs with the IN-
ACOD emblem reading ‘stop clandestine mi-
gration’. An explicit stance against clandestine 
migration on the part of a migration broker in 
Cameroon is quite exceptional. Many brokers 
did not consider it necessary to foreground the 
legality of their work, and neither were they 
defensive about not working within the illegal 
sphere. Questions of illegality were hardly ever 
discussed between aspiring migrants and mi-
gration brokers. During my research in Cam-
eroon, only one broker explicitly positioned 
himself as not being a trafficker or a smuggler. 
He had himself lived for a few years without 
papers in Europe and was amongst all brokers 
the most accustomed to circulating discourses 
about “illegal migration” in countries of arrival. 
At one level, the signboards against clandestine 
migration are simply advertisements granting 
further legitimacy to Mr. James’ work. While 
the advertisement of Mr. James should not 
be taken at face value, it does require serious 
analysis to understand why such claims and 
self-portrayals can fall on fertile ground in a 
society of departure. 
The second NGO of this paper is called 
AALC which stands for ‘Africa Asia Learning 
Connection’. When Mr. Walter, the director 
of AALC, was deported back to Cameroon 
by Chinese state authorities during one of his 
many trips, I was struck to find that most of 
his clients did not even notice that he had been 
deported. After his deportation, Mr. Walter 
continued to operate and make other people 
leave the country. Visas continued to appear 
on the passports of his applicants. As for his 
own capacity to travel, he planned to purchase 
a Ghanaian passport and continue his journeys 
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as a Ghanaian. The credibility of migration 
brokers is not necessarily at danger even when 
they are directly and personally confronted 
with an event in which their own travel docu-
ments are classified as illegal.
The case of Mr. Walter suggests that there 
are limits to the role of the law for the rise and 
fall of migration brokers. Public discourses in 
Europe easily and readily connect third-party 
mediated forms of migration with smuggling, 
trafficking and illegality. In Cameroon, howev-
er, most brokers advertised and practiced their 
work publicly and openly. In most cases, as-
piring migrants would not question the qual-
ity of their travel documents on the basis of 
these being issued by a migration broker. In 
this paper, I will show that the supposed op-
position between migration brokerage and the 
state (as marked out by the human smuggling 
paradigm) is problematic. The two case studies 
of this paper will illustrate how migration bro-
kers are in different ways intertwined with in-
stances of stateness both in Cameroon and in 
receiving states. By instances of stateness I refer 
to an ensemble of state actors and state insti-
tutions, as well as its regulatory instruments 
(such as papers) and normative frameworks 
(such as legality). I use the term stateness be-
cause I want to include modalities of power 
and representational discourses that draw on 
the state as a set of institutions, as well as a dis-
cursive construction (Mitchell 2006: 177-182; 
Gupta 2006: 212-213). 
States have increasingly privatised parts 
of the domain of migration control (Gam-
meltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2012). 
As a consequence, a series of new actors are le-
gitimated and authorised by state authorities 
to participate in the attribution of travel docu-
ments and carry out controls at border points. 
The pluralisation of border authorities is a 
process that is not exclusively engendered by 
explicit state policy. Indirectly migration poli-
cies have created a situation in which aspiring 
migrants often cannot realize their aspirations 
to migrate. In the face of ever greater degrees 
of involuntary immobility (Carling 2002), a 
demand for services of migration brokers has 
emerged in emigration countries. Given that 
the consulates of Northern states to a large ex-
tent no longer are likely or reliable sources of 
visas for aspiring migrants in Southern coun-
tries, migration brokers have emerged to fill 
the gap. 
This working paper is based on 13 months 
of ethnographic fieldwork between 2007 and 
2009, as well as a series of follow up interviews 
in 2010. During the fieldwork period, I was 
mainly based in the provincial capital and uni-
versity town of Buea. The paper predominant-
ly draws on research material from two migra-
tion brokers, called Mr. James and Mr. Walter. 
Because of the status that is implied in being 
able to send people out of the country, my two 
key informants were generally proud to let me 
observe the daily workings of their respective 
offices.2 The presence of a ‘white’ person with 
European citizenship at their offices was a wel-
come further increase in their status and ap-
pearance in society.3 
The main working hypothesis is that mar-
ket and state forms of border policing both 
condition and feed into each other. First, I ask 
how aspiring migrants conceive and evaluate 
the travel documents that migration brokers 
2 Large parts of the work of Mr. James and Mr. Walter oc-
curred outside of their offices. The research tried as much 
as possible to follow the brokers on visits to clients, trips 
to the airport, and meetings with travel agents. Yet, the main 
focus of the research remained the respective personalities 
of the two key informants. Thus, the research was not able 
to illuminate the entire chain and networks through which 
the brokers conducted their work.
3  I also worked with some other migration brokers. Those 
brokers who were less institutionally established than the 
offices of Mr. Walter and Mr. James were more reluctant to 
let me follow their work.
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issue. I put forward that migration brokerage 
must be seen in relation to what it means for 
aspiring migrants to acquire and use papers 
within the context of the Cameroonian state. 
Secondly, the paper asks how persons like Mr. 
James and Mr. Walter were able to emerge to 
the position of migration brokers. The paper 
explains the personal connections between mi-
gration brokers and state actors, as well as their 
functions, structures, and cultural repertoires. 
I conclude with a call for empirical studies of 
the place and role of migration law within mi-
gration dynamics.
MiGratiON brOKeraGe  
aND the laW
Both in academia and in policy, the work of 
migration brokers has most commonly been 
approached through the frameworks of smug-
gling and trafficking. Both frameworks are 
closely intertwined with legal definitions that 
came out of the associated Protocols of the 
Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime (also known as the Palermo Protocols). 
Within the Palermo Protocols, the distinction 
between the definitions of smuggling and traf-
ficking is that smugglers violate state borders 
(Gallagher 2002: 25-27; van Liempt 2006: 
27-28), while traffickers violate the security 
of the migrants (Wong 2005: 80-82).4 Both 
discursive frameworks criminalise the broker. 
In the case of human trafficking, the broker is 
theoretically criminalised for the human rights 
4  For a historical and sociological discussion of how this 
legal definition came into being, see Ditmore and Wijers 
2003, as well as Ditmore 2005. Distinctions between smug-
gling and trafficking, as well as the inherent assumptions 
within both definitions are problematic in many ways. For 
closer analysis, see Anderson 2007; Andrijasevic 2010; and 
Kapur 2005.
violations of the respective migrants. In the 
case of human smuggling, the legal convention 
explicitly frames migration brokers as working 
in opposition to the state. In practice, poli-
cies against human trafficking and smuggling 
merge with initiatives against so-called ‘illegal 
migration’.
In the efforts to regulate migration, states 
distinguish between what according to their 
own laws is classified as either legal and ille-
gal migration. In line with the perspective of 
states, the migration trajectories that come out 
of brokerage transactions are commonly char-
acterised by both scholars and policy makers 
as either smuggling or trafficking, legal or ille-
gal, regular or irregular, formal or informal (for 
example Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). 
Even if brokers are not directly classified as 
traffickers or smugglers, the issue of illegality is 
high on the agenda within discussions of bro-
kered migration trajectories. 
Even when used in highly critical manners, 
distinctions between legal and illegal brokers 
always imply an implicit statist standpoint. So-
cial sciences have often taken the nation state 
as the starting point and implicit perspective 
from which the effects and dynamics of mi-
gration are analysed (De Genova 2002: 421; 
Abraham and van Schendel 2005; McKeown 
2012; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Stat-
ist approaches analyse brokerage through cat-
egories and terminology of the state.5 Aspiring 
migrants, however, do not distinguish between 
brokers in terms of their relationship to the law 
(Spener 2009). In Anglophone Cameroon, for 
example, aspiring migrants establish degrees 
of trustworthiness according to the intentions 
and capacities of respective brokers (Alpes 
5 For a critique of the usage of statist categories within 
social science research in migration, see also Malkki (1995) 
and Anderson (2007).
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forthcoming). To distinguish between smug-
glers and traffickers, or between legal and ille-
gal brokers is thus to impose a viewpoint that 
is relevant to the state’s ambitions of regulating 
migration, but not to migrants themselves.
Because of the predominance of a stat-
ist perspective, what has been lacking within 
debates on brokerage have been empirical in-
sights into how migrants themselves view their 
actions (Kyle and Siracusa 2005: 155). New 
research that analyses migration brokers from 
the perspective of actual as well as aspiring mi-
grants is opening up promising avenues for our 
understanding of brokerage practices in migra-
tion (Spener 2009; Lucht 2012; Lindquist et 
al. 2012). Based on ethnographic specificity, 
these pieces of research give insights into local 
power dynamics between brokers and aspiring 
migrants, illustrating how closely aspiring mi-
grants are personally connected with brokers, 
as well as how well-respected brokers are with-
in their respective home communities. 
The focus of ethnographic broker studies 
has remained on relations between brokers and 
migrants and less on the place and role of bro-
kers within the wider organisational logics of 
migration. While it is important for an under-
standing of brokerage work to shift away from 
“seeing like the state” (Scott 1998), it nonethe-
less remains crucial to see the state by means 
of recognizing its important role in creating 
basic structural conditions within and through 
which brokers, migrants, and family mem-
bers move. I suggest that this is possible by 
paying attention to three elements: first of all 
by uncovering theoretical assumptions about 
connections between legality and legitimacy; 
secondly, by empirically analysing (rather than 
presupposing) the reach, place and relevance 
of the law within conditions of departure; and 
thirdly, brokers need to be studied in relation 
to other regulatory authorities, such as the 
state and the family. I will discuss each element 
in turn.
First, insights from political anthropology 
can keep migration scholars from presuppos-
ing that informality implies illegality and for-
mality legality (Hibou 1999). Because of the 
state’s success in monopolising the legitimate 
means of mobility control (Torpey 2002), stat-
ist classifications of legality have come to stand 
for distinctions of different degrees of legitima-
cy. Unless explicitly positioned within the field 
of socio-legal studies (for example Chauvin 
and Mascarenas 2012), much academic work 
on migration control is characterised by a legal 
consciousness (Silbey 2005; Fleury-Steiner and 
Nielsen 2006) that takes legality as the main 
marker of legitimacy. De facto, however, the 
state is only one of many regulatory authorities 
that compete for the shaping and making of 
migration trajectories (Alpes 2011). 
Secondly, if committed to shifting away 
from a statist analysis of migration, the respec-
tive realness or fakeness of travel documents 
only needs to be analysed if and when being of 
relevance to the actors in question. The reach 
and relevance of the law cannot be taken for 
granted, but needs to be subject to empirical 
analysis. Public and academic debates often 
simply assume that processes of illegalisation 
within countries of arrival predetermine the ac-
tions of aspiring migrants, as well as the scope 
of actions of migration brokers at points of 
departure. State distinctions between legal and 
illegal brokers become relevant when they have 
an effect on actors that try to move. I do not 
take illegality as a conceptual tool of analysis, 
but suggest including illegality into the analy-
sis only when it emerges as an empirical reali-
ty of relevance to people under study. Instead 
of prejudging people, activities, or objects ac-
cording to future classifications by state actors 
as either ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’, I suggest empirically 
enquiring into how illegality does or does not 
figure within a place of departure. 
Thirdly, I suggest broadening our vision of reg-
ulatory authorities within migration control 
DIIS WORKING PAPER 2013:07
9
and to consider migration brokers as one of 
many actors within the governance of borders. 
Migration brokers sell services that enable 
people to travel in the face of state-enforced 
immobility. As such, they de facto function as 
border authorities. Even if migration brokers 
are not recognised by state authorities, they 
do engage in acts that contribute towards the 
governance of border spaces. It is therefore im-
portant to consider both state officials and mi-
gration brokers as regulatory authorities that 
shape the context in which aspiring migrants 
and migrants move. To theorize from the van-
tage point of a plurality of regulatory authori-
ties allows for analysing migration trajectories 
in a way that is not state-centric, but instead 
grounded in the perspective of people who try 
to move.
By placing migration brokers within a 
broader field of actors engaged in the policing 
of borders, I draw on insights within political 
anthropology on processes of state formation 
(Mitchell 2006; Gupta 2006; Ferguson 2006) 
as well as on the regulation of cross-border 
trade (Roitman 2005; Chalfin 2010). By mov-
ing away from a statist perspective that ‘sees 
like the state’ to a migrant perspective that ac-
tually sees the state, new insights open up into 
personal, institutional, and symbolic connec-
tions between brokerage and instances of state-
ness. Brokers connect and overlap personally, 
symbolically, and institutionally with instances 
of stateness. 
An ethnographic approach to cross-border 
trade and migration can reveal unexpected 
connections between illegality and brokerage. 
By paying attention to the three above-de-
scribed elements, overlaps between different 
regulatory authorities can be analysed also for 
their productive spin-off effects. In the case of 
cross-border movements in the Chad basin, 
for example, Roitman has pointed out how 
smuggling and banditry create wealth that 
is channelled to instances of stateness both 
through tax and through personalised transfers 
that complement the salaries of state officials 
(Roitman 2005: 151-198).6 Within a statist 
perspective, as well as within a perspective that 
only focuses on the subjectivities of migrants 
and brokers, productive overlaps between dif-
ferent regulatory authorities will remain invis-
ible to the analyst.
 
tO fOllOW DOKi:  the pOWers 
Of travel DOCuMeNts 
Since the late 1990s, migration brokers have 
become important actors for aspiring migrants 
in Anglophone Cameroon. Owing to the sta-
tus that currently comes with transcontinental 
mobility, migration brokers have acquired the 
position of public authorities. Always dressed 
in a suit, Mr. James liked to talk of himself as 
”director”. Initially, he had five staff members 
in his office in Buea. In 2008 he opened anoth-
er office in Bamenda with another seven staff 
members as well as further contact points and 
potential new offices in four further cities in 
Cameroon. He employed 26 people and ac-
cording to his records had sent out 40-55 peo-
ple from his office in Buea within the year of 
2008 alone.
The credibility of migration brokers as le-
gitimate sources of travel documentation 
needs to be related to forms of regulation and 
paper production in the Cameroonian context 
of stateness. After having passed his A-level 
exam in evening school, Mr. James was able 
6 The wealth that is created in cross-border smuggling is 
also used to pay state taxes, as well as to directly comple-
ment the salaries of state officials. For military personnel 
and customs officials, rent on fraudulent commerce can be 
more important than official salaries. In part, cross-border 
traders manage to pay their taxes through banditry (Roit-
man 2004).
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to find work with the German development 
agency GTZ – which was the beginning of his 
ascension to the status of a ‘big man’. While 
working for the GTZ, Mr. James began doing 
minor paperwork for people who wanted to 
travel abroad. These forms of paper production 
could be anything from helping people to fill 
in forms – e.g. visa or university applications 
– to establishing other connections or actually 
manufacturing papers. Because of his connec-
tions to an international development agency, 
Mr. James had learned about the bureaucratic 
norms necessary for visa applications at consu-
lates. After a few years, Mr. James decided to 
open up his own NGO. 
In Anglophone Cameroon, “to follow doki” 
– Pidgin for following up on paper work – has 
come to stand largely for preparing and trying 
to travel out. As papers hold strong powers over 
possibilities of mobility, wanting to go out has 
become synonymous with doing paper work. 
To apply for a visa, many papers are needed, 
such as for example bank statements, reference 
letters for internships or certificates to docu-
ment work experience. Not all of these forms 
of documentation are automatically issued 
in everyday life in Cameroon. Many types of 
employment occur without written work con-
tracts. Consequently, many forms of docu-
mentation have to be obtained and produced 
specifically for an international travel project.
In Pidgin, the word ‘doki’ can refer to all 
forms of papers, regardless of the type of me-
diators that were involved within the produc-
tion process – or not. Within the Cameroo-
nian state, different forms of mediation have 
emerged (Bayart 1979). In West Africa, state 
institutions and their services are often only 
accessible through additional brokers or ser-
vice providers, such as ‘touts’ (Smith 2007: 
60). Similar to the cases of other countries 
on the African continent (Hornberger 2009: 
90; Blundo 2006: 809; Lund 2007), people’s 
strategies in Cameroon for approaching state 
institutions are often to try and personalise re-
lations or, in the absence of this possibility, to 
pass through a mediator. Intermediaries can be 
independent businessmen, bureaucrats or ex-
tended family members. In the Cameroonian 
context, to attain papers through mediators is 
so much part of everyday experiences that as-
piring migrants do not put into question the 
quality or legitimacy of the attained paper. In-
stead, intermediaries also offer valuable servic-
es in the face of a corrupt and highly person-
alized bureaucracy (Smith 2007: 60). If access 
to services of the Cameroonian state requires 
professional mediation, then access to visas 
certainly does.
As a migration broker, Mr. James was in-
volved in the production of a great variety of 
different types of travel documents. Because 
Dubai does not have an Embassy in Cameroon, 
Mr. James mediated between his clients and au-
thorities in Dubai. The Dubai programme cost 
1.8 million CFA (roughly 2,700 EUR) and 
included a (one-way) flight, pick-up from the 
airport, the visa, a few days’ accommodation, 
and supposed assistance with the job hunt. The 
employees of INACOD explained that they 
were dealing directly with the ministry of for-
eign affairs in Dubai, which had commissioned 
an agency to handle visas. INACOD scanned 
the passports of its clients and sent these to the 
handling agency in Dubai. The visa was then 
sent to INACOD in the form of a letter. Instead 
of a stamp or sticker within the passport of the 
respective traveller, this simple piece of paper 
constituted the permit to travel and allowed for 
entry into Dubai territory upon arrival at the 
airport. In addition, Mr. James for a while also 
had established deals with companies in Dubai 
to recruit welders, mechanic drivers and nurses 
from Cameroon. These companies pay for the 
visas and flight tickets of their future employ-
ees. The programmes for the welders cost 1.3 
million (roughly 2,000 EUR) and included a 
work contract for three years. 
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Another important field of work for INACOD 
lay in the facilitation of university studies 
abroad. Here, Mr. James focused on advertis-
ing American and British Universities that had 
off-site campuses in Dubai or other countries 
for which a visa could be acquired more easily 
than in the USA and Great Britain. Following 
the strong demand for migration programmes 
for Europe or North America, Mr. James fi-
nally also regularly tried to send out people 
through tourist visas secured through the help 
of other mediators both in Cameroon and in 
Europe. He even welcomed clients who wished 
to merely receive a Cameroonian passport.
Not only did the types of papers Mr. James 
gave to his clients vary, the processes through 
which he acquired, produced, and got hold of 
these papers differed greatly, too. As a broker, 
one could argue that Mr. James engaged in the 
production of – what would be qualified by 
state agents as – both “legal” and “illegal” travel 
documents. A great part of his persuasive pow-
ers as a broker stemmed precisely from being 
capable of playing between different registers. 
If clients were returned from Europe or North-
ern America, he was mostly able to redirect 
these people to Dubai. Many of the flights of 
INACOD clients would pass through a transit 
airport in Dubai before connecting onwards 
to an airport in Europe. In the case his clients 
were denied entry upon arrival in Europe, this 
meant that Mr. James could instruct his clients 
on their way back to Cameroon to stay on in 
Dubai where he had connection men at the 
airport. In the eyes of the public in Cameroon, 
his clients would have still left Cameroon. 
The question of whether a travel document 
is fake or real can also be indeterminable. As 
an emic term, the word doki in Anglophone 
Cameroon can point us towards the volatility 
of legal processes of paper production. A closer 
look at the production of documents as ma-
terial artefacts and their inclusion into bodies 
of official knowledge unravels the potential 
fake ”quality inherent to all papers and forms 
of documentation” (Navaro-Yashin 2007: 94). 
Legal processes of paper production are volatile 
in that the inclusion of papers into bodies of 
legal documents always also includes moments 
of interpretation. This holds true for processes 
of legalisation and documentation within the 
European context too (Chauvin and Mascare-
nas 2012). 
Statist distinctions between legal and ille-
gal can furthermore even be irrelevant. A so-
called ‘fake’ travel permit can still ‘work’ and 
allow the holder of the permit to cross a border 
point.7 During my observations of interactions 
between aspiring migrants and Mr. James, I 
was often struck by the absence of any kind 
of substantial discussion about the origins and 
nature of the travel documents that would be 
necessary for the agreed travel projects. Aspir-
ing migrants evaluated brokered travel permits 
not in terms of their potential future classifica-
tion as legal or illegal but according to their ef-
ficiency at border crossings. From the perspec-
tive of departure, what matters is the capacity 
and power of papers to secure the mobility of 
people. As an informant put it:
I will respect both of them because they 
have the power to get the visa. They have 
the power to make you have the visa in 
your passports. I don’t know what they do 
or what it takes, but […] the important 
thing is that you are in Europe and it’s be-
cause of [them].
7 The reverse can equally be true. The Canadian consulate 
section in Paris did not accept as genuine an attestation in 
which I certified my research assistant that she had been 
working for me in Cameroon. The attestation was judged 
dubious because it did not contain enough ‘securities’. 
While her work relationship might be categorised by cer-
tain state actors as ‘informal’, her work was certainly not 
illegal.
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The production of travel documents is consid-
ered a question of ‘power’ rather than a ques-
tion of legality precisely because access paths to 
legal migration are available only to the small-
est section of the population. 
While states might stress the symbolic 
value of travel documents and pieces of iden-
tification, individuals might have much more 
pragmatic relations with forms of paper doc-
umentation (Bakewell 2007). Visas are not 
only symbolic icons of legal migration but also 
material artefacts that in most cases allow indi-
viduals to move across a border checkpoint. As 
pointed out in the introduction, aspiring mi-
grants do not necessarily associate migration 
brokers with so-called ‘illegal migration’.8 The 
fees that aspiring migrants pay to migration 
brokers are instead expected to allow them to 
travel out of Cameroon with travel documents. 
Migration brokers are agencies that have the 
know-how or the types of connections to pro-
duce forms of paper that in many cases enable 
aspiring migrants to cross borders at both the 
Cameroonian airport as well as the airport in 
the respective country of arrival.
OffiCes, DepartMeNts,  aND 
aMbassaDOrs:  the WOrKiNGs 
Of tWO MiGratiON brOKers
Migration brokers in Cameroon are perceived 
as one type among many other actors but not 
necessarily as actors that work against or are 
different from the state. When Mr. Walter was 
deported, local observers were surprised that it 
was possible for Mr. Walter to even be deport-
8  So as to avoid the essentialisation of people’s concep-
tions of papers (Kohlhagen 2006), it is important to study 
the social and legal context in which individuals are lead 
(or not) to attach symbolic attributes to travel documents 
beyond the one of their mere practical function.
ed in the first place. “A man who can send peo-
ple (children) abroad, they can still send him 
back?” They were surprised that states should 
have the power to deport a migration broker – 
which implies that they considered brokers as 
one with other officials. I will explore in this 
section how migration brokerage offices like 
INACOD and AALC are intertwined with the 
activities, functions, and cultural repertoires of 
both sending and receiving states. 
Work in migration brokerage constitutes a 
livelihood strategy in a context where formal 
employment (amongst others within the state 
sector) is not always sufficient to maintain a 
family household. To operate as a migration 
broker enabled Mr. Walter to generate a better 
income for himself than merely working as a 
state employee. He first worked for a few years 
as a mathematics teacher before he turned to 
the more lucrative business of migration bro-
kerage. The financial status of a teacher in 
Cameroon is modest and salaries of civil serv-
ants are often paid on an irregular basis. It is in 
this context that Mr. Walter tried to migrate, 
but the British Embassy refused him. The Chi-
nese Embassy was less stringent and he set off 
to establish trading activities between China 
and Cameroon. From there, it was but a small 
step to offer his insights of life abroad to also 
help others – against a fee – to come to China. 
Migration broker offices are mostly regulat-
ed by the Cameroonian state in the form of 
NGOs in the field of development, but not 
formally as businesses or travel agencies. When 
Mr. Walter started his brokerage work he reg-
istered his office as an NGO. To register his 
business as an NGO allowed him to escape 
the harsh and often arbitrary taxation regime 
of the Cameroonian state. Because taxation in 
Cameroon is unpredictable and often harsh, 
many businessmen can only survive if they 
have connections with state officials. Harsh 
and arbitrary taxation can cause businessmen 
to turn to migration brokerage, too. A broker 
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called Mr. Ekkas explained to me that he took 
to working in migration brokerage because he 
feared every year for the survival of his compa-
ny that traded and sold electronic equipment. 
“I’m doing anything because I’m obliged to 
meet up with government taxes.” 
Laws of the Cameroonian state itself might 
not be violated even if brokers within its ju-
risdiction produce papers that may result in 
what is characterized as illegal migration. Mr. 
Walter told me repeatedly that he considered 
himself safe with respect to state authorities 
in Cameroon. Through listening to his phone 
conversations, I knew that Mr. Walter was also 
sending out the children of military personnel 
he knew from his days in Yaoundé. He had 
enough good connections to be able ”not to 
get into trouble” if ever he were put on trial in 
court for the case of a particular client. Some-
times in his narrations he talked to me about 
having come back from a court. His narratives 
were always one of victory. When telling me 
about having had to go to court, he praised 
either the power of his rhetoric or the strength 
of his connections that had ended the trial.
Mr. Walter was able to conduct much of his 
work because he was a graduate of an elitist 
school attended by students that later become 
state officials. Many former classmates of Mr. 
Walters were among the political elite of the 
country or within the military. Even while at 
school, his dynamic personality helped him 
mediate positions with bureaucrats and po-
litical figureheads for his fellow graduates. As 
mediation is deeply built into the functioning 
of the Cameroonian state system (Bayart et al. 
1999; Bayart 2009), mediation is crucial for 
graduates to find employment as civil servants. 
Migration brokers base their capacity and 
legitimacy on emulations of forms of state-
ness, as well as on portrayals of international 
connections. Mr. Walter often walked around 
with several Cameroonian passports of his cli-
ents in his blazer jacket. He liked to take out 
these passports to show the visas inside. Both 
Mr. Walter and Mr. James referred to aspiring 
migrants as applicants. When aspiring mi-
grants came to the offices of INACOD and 
AALC, they had to pay a fee to open a file for 
their registration. While I have never seen Mr. 
James work on his laptop, he always received 
his clients sitting beside his computer. His cli-
ents respected this official air of his function, 
as well as his international reputation. To walk 
into the office of Mr. James, one also had to 
pass a Swiss Air poster onto which an INA-
COD poster had been inserted. The Swiss Air 
and the INACOD posters were joined in such 
a manner as to create the impression that the 
two were official ‘partners’. 
Mr. James skilfully built up his authori-
ty through a combination of what might be 
termed old and new types of authority (Daloz 
2002: 278). Although deeply sceptical of the 
capacities of Mr. James, a client of his, Pamel-
la, still referred to him in terms of official ter-
minology. ”Your job is not just for Camerooni-
ans, for individuals. You’re like an Ambassador 
for Cameroon.” In their interactions, Pamella 
also referred to Mr. James as ”chief.” By calling 
Mr. James a chief, Pamella confirmed his au-
thority, but also his social role and responsibil-
ity.9 In his village of origin in the North West 
province Mr. James was nominated national 
youth director. In this function he organized 
football tournaments donated with prizes. He 
also proudly told me how he was intending to 
make connections between those in the village 
and migrants from his village of origin in the 
North West Province. 
Brokers can be credible because they are per-
ceived as authority figures that not only mirror 
9 While ambassadors are representatives of state authority, 
ambassadors in the Anglophone Cameroonian context can 
also refer to the representation of villages or home com-
munities in other regions in Cameroon.
DIIS WORKING PAPER 2013:07
14
cultural repertoires of stateness, but also func-
tion in similar ways. Mr. James and Mr. Walter 
produced and issued forms of documentation 
that allowed people to travel. In discussing the 
difficulties and risks of migration, Pamella’s 
father told me that this was precisely why he 
went to ”this new department”, referring to 
the office of INACOD. Concerning the nec-
essary papers for travelling out, he assured me 
that Pamella already had a passport. ”Yes, it is 
difficult to have a visa, but this department ... 
office here can help.” Pamella’s parents chose 
to trust ”this new department” set up by Mr. 
James. The word ”department” references a 
public authority and often is used in relation 
to state institutions. It is as if, for Pamella’s fa-
ther, the manager of INACOD and the people 
at the embassy were part of the same official 
world. 
In the way in which Mr. James ran his 
NGO – which equally functioned as a trav-
el agency and as an educational institution – 
we see a creative mix of relational dynamics 
to state authorities in Cameroon and abroad. 
Next to his travel programmes, Mr. James had 
also set up what he called ”educational guid-
ance and career advice”. Throughout 2007 and 
2008, he managed to enter into more official 
partnerships with educational institutions and 
authorities, such as various secondary schools, 
professional training schools, and the educa-
tional secretaries of various churches. The of-
ficial partnership agreements were formalised 
on paper stating that INACOD staff would 
provide career counselling and educational 
orientation at secondary schools as well as help 
professional schools to recruit new students 
from the former. Finally, Mr. James took up 
contact with the National Employment Fund 
in Cameroon. Mr. James informed me shortly 
after the opening of the Dubai programmes for 
welders and nurses that the National Employ-
ment Fund would be paying half of the salary 
of the staff of his offices. With this step, he had 
come a long way towards his ambitions. 
Where the government and state institu-
tions lacked the authority to assist the commu-
nity and bring along development, brokers fill 
the gap and respond to the needs of the mar-
ket. Mr. James considered his real colleagues 
to be the educational secretaries of churches 
and people within the ministries. He would 
have been offended had I dared to compare 
him with people that merely reproduce and 
sell travel documents. From the perspective 
of people in places of departure, brokers and 
official actors might share more cultural and 
symbolic repertories than legal classifications 
allow for.
CONClusiON
This working paper has posed both an empir-
ical and a theoretical question. On an empiri-
cal level the discussion of brokers, such as Mr. 
James and Mr. Walter, indicates the impor-
tance of considering migration control from a 
non-statist perspective. Migration brokers can 
be credible with their claim to fight clandes-
tine migration because the meaning and role 
of travel documents, brokerage, and legality all 
need to be analysed in relation to the experienc-
es of aspiring migrants within their context of 
departure. Mr. James, for example, has arranged 
for the employees of his agency to carry sign-
boards that read ”stop clandestine migration” 
because he does not consider his work in terms 
of illegality. The meaning of illegal migration 
is limited to overland migration where people 
cross borders without travel documents. Instead 
the clients sent out by migration brokers are all 
equipped with documents and in many cases 
these documents pass the test of state controls.
On a theoretical level, the working paper 
has explored how market-mediated forms of 
migration relate to the realm of the state and 
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of the law. By tracing a detailed picture of the 
workings of two migration broker offices in An-
glophone Cameroon, this working paper has 
sought to understand brokerage networks not 
as external to state power but rather as integral 
to new forms of governance and governmental-
ities (Lindquist et al. 2012: 13). First of all, the 
paper argues that a close understanding of how 
people access the state within their places of 
departure can open up new understandings of 
how the travel document of migration brokers 
come to be evaluated by aspiring migrants. As-
piring migrants evaluate migration brokers less 
in relation to locations of paper production and 
more in terms of the efficiency of travel doc-
uments. Consequently, migration brokerage 
needs to be analysed within a broader context 
of brokerage practices and cultures of stateness 
in places of origin. 
Secondly, this working paper puts forward 
that migration brokers can be intertwined with 
instances of stateness on different levels and 
manners, i.e. symbolically, personally, and even 
institutionally. Migration brokers can be credi-
ble as sources of travel documents because they 
draw on cultural repertoires of the state and at 
times are institutionally and/or personally con-
nected to instances of stateness. Besides these 
resemblances and connections, migration bro-
kers have also started to fulfil state-like func-
tions. In the context of the commercialisation 
of border policing, brokers deliver travel docu-
ments that in many cases enable aspiring mi-
grants to achieve their ambitions of mobility.
In a quest for a better understanding of 
state and market forms of border policing, it 
is important to not only study how migration 
brokers relate to the law, but also how the law 
relates to the practice of migration brokerage. 
Border spaces are regulated by state actors and 
state-sanctioned private actors, but also by 
semi-institutional forms of brokerage that re-
spond to a demand for migration services with-
in places of departure. Migration brokers are 
able to sell services to aspiring migrants because 
migration law has created a demand for migra-
tion services. In creating the market for bro-
kers, state regulation is intimately intertwined 
with the emergence of migration brokerage. 
Migration brokerage needs to be studied 
through an analytical lens that recognises the 
state as an important regulatory authority, but 
stays clear of a statist perspective. Research on 
the governance of migration is highly diffused 
with the political agendas of states within the 
global North. This has lead to the dominance 
of very state-driven approaches towards the 
study of migration control. On the other hand, 
states through their (migration) laws and policy 
discourses create important conditions of pos-
sibility for brokers and migrants alike. Statist 
discourses on and approaches towards migra-
tion do in and by themselves create realities 
for brokers and migrants that deserve scholarly 
attention. To turn away from ”seeing like the 
state” (Scott 1998) is not the same as no longer 
studying the effects of state laws for the organi-
sational logics of migration.
By working towards an analysis that theo-
rises connections between brokerage and ille-
gality in a less statist manner, scholars need to 
take alternative normative markers of legitima-
cy and illegitimacy into account. This stance 
would imply turning away from assumptions 
about the all-pervasiveness and powers of law. 
De Genova (2002) has moved forward schol-
arship on migration calling for studies of how 
legality and illegality are separate processes of 
historical and political constructions, prior to 
an analysis of how these terms are used to label 
people, activities, or trajectories. I build on his 
work by turning the question of illegality into 
an empirical question. To classify migration 
brokers in terms of their respective legality or il-
legality expresses a belief about the reach of the 
law within emigration contexts. Instead, what 
is needed are empirical studies of the place of 
the law within the policing of borders. 
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